讲座:Benefiting from Bias

发布日期: 2019-12-05 来源:kyky 462

报告主题:Benefiting from Bias

报告人:高 鑫

主持人:宋华盛

  :2019年12月12日星期四 15:00―16:30

  :玉泉校区经济学院418

Abstract: A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. The agent does not initially observe this state, but he can learn about it by privately experimenting, at a cost. We characterize the principal's optimal delegation set. This set has a cap to restrict the agent's bias, but it may have a hole around safe decisions in order to encourage information acquisition. Unlike in standard delegation models, the principal's payoff is maximized when the agent's bias is nonzero. 

:德国曼汉姆大学经济学博士,剑桥大学博士后,研究方向为微观理论,信息经济学和机制设计。