题  目：Empirical Evidence on Competition and Revenue in an All-Pay Contest​

报告人：许敏波   助理教授  北京师范大学

主持人：夏昪君   浙江大学经济学院

时  间：2015年5月13日   星期三   15:30-17:00

地  点：浙大玉泉校区外经贸大楼236室

                               

                     欢迎广大师生参加！

ABSTRACT：The total revenue from an all-pay contest is the sum of expenditures from all individual players, so it is important to ask whether it increases with the number of players, our definition of competition. This is the first paper to use field data to empirically study this question. We document strong empirical evidence that the total revenue of penny auctions, a form of all-pay contest that recently emerged on the Internet, increases with the potential or actual number of bidders.

 

                                                                                     CRPE秘书处

                                                                                      2015-5-8