（更新）首届浙江大学---南洋理工大学联合WORKSHOP的通知
发布日期： 2011-12-08 来源：yjsjy 
2626
2626
时间：2011年12月13日8:45 am---5:30 pm
地点：浙江大学外经贸大楼418
欢迎所有教师和学生参加！
附：会议议程
The First Joint NTU/ZJU Workshop
Tuesday, December 13, 2011
Zhejiang University School of Economics
Hangzhou, China
Conference Location: Room 418, School of Economics
8:45 Welcoming Address: Dean Xiangrong Jin
9:00-10:30 Weihong Huang, NTU
The Wisdom of Simple Strategies---An Appreciation of Price-taking Behavior
Bing Ye, ZJU
Multi-homing, Product Differentiation and Competition
10:30-11:00 Break
11:00-12:30 Jipeng Zhang, NTU
Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment with Steady Inflow of Inexperienced Traders
Baomin Dong, ZJU
The Uninformed Consumer Problem
12:30-2:00 Lunch
2:00-3:30 Youngho Chang, NTU
Dynamics between Strategic Commodities and Financial Variables
Xiaolin Xue, ZJU
Executive Compensation with Endogenous Risk and Asymmetric Cost
3:30-4:00 Break
4:00-5:30 Feng Qu, NTU
A Lagrange Multiplier Test for Cross-sectional Dependence in a Fixed Effects Panel Data Model
Related Party Transactions and Institutional Investors in Chinese Listed Companies
6:30 Conference Dinner
Abstracts of Conference Papers
Huang Weihong
The Wisdom of Simple Strategies -----An Appreciation of Price-taking Behavior
In a quantity-competed oligopoly, a profit maximizing firm will always leverage on all available information to "best response" to its rivals' outputs. It is deemed economically irrational if a firm ignores its market power by behaving as a price-taker. However, such beliefs were challenged if all firms produce an identical product with an identical technology (Huang, 2002). It turns out that a naive price-taker will perform no worse or even better than all sophisticated rivals in any stable equilibrium, regardless of what strategies these firms may adopt. When the total number of firms in an oligopoly exceeds three, a firm may prefer to adopt "price-taking" strategy not just for the higher relative profit compared to the rest but also higher instantaneous profit. Under many circumstances, "price-taking behavior" can be a Nash-equilibrium strategy or even the dominant strategy in game-theoretical sense.
Bing Ye
Multi-homing, Product Differentiation and Competition
This paper investigates the competition between two horizontally differentiated firms (platforms) whose products have partially overlapping functionalities. If firms make their products compatible with each other, consumers can consume both products and derive utility from the non-overlapping functionalities. We show that the equilibrium compatibility level chosen by firms is less than socially optimal. In addition, less differentiated products would induce both firms and social welfare maximizer to allow purchasing both. If we extend the model to a two-sided framework, the platform with a higher quality product would enforce single purchase if the network externality is large enough.
Zhang Jipeng
Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment with Steady Inflow of Inexperienced Traders
In this paper, we revisit the effect of traders' experience on bubble formation in the experimental asset market and reconcile some contrasting findings on the relationship between experience and bubble from experimental and field studies. Specifically, as we introduce a steady inflow of inexperienced traders in the repeatedly operated asset markets, bubbles are not substantially abated and most bubble measures are not significantly different across the sequence of the asset markets. Our findings demonstrate that the inflow of new traders plays a role in the formation of asset bubble and the importance of such new-trader effect, comparing to the experience/learning effect, depends on the proportion of new traders in the market.
Baomin Dong
The Uninformed Consumer Problem
This paper studies the informed consumer problem in a two-type monopoly setting where a pure strategy equilibrium for the low-quality monopolist may fail to exist. When the low-quality product is sufficiently desirable, the high-quality monopoly may use a low and increasing price to signal quality. This is in contrast with Bagwell and Riordan (1991)'s "high and declining prices signal quality" result. The intuition is that by making it not attractive for the low-quality firm to mimic, the high-quality monopoly is able to make sales to the uninformed consumers. It is further shown that if consumers can acquire product information by a noisy signal at a cost, then the seller may prefer to use a random contract and completely eliminate pre-informed consumers. The reason why a high type seller is able to extract more profit by making all buyers uninformed is that by a random contract, the uninformed buyers who do not purchase in the sequential move game will enter the contract. Therefore in the undefeated equilibrium (Mailath et al, 1993) of the game, the high-type monopolist may profit from the introduction of a random contract which prohibits signaling or consumer learning.
Chang Youngho
Dynamics between Strategic Commodities and Financial Variables
This study employs the bounds testing approach to cointegration to investigate the relationships between the prices of two strategic commodities (oil and gold) and the financial variables (interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices) of Japan – a major oil-consuming and gold-holding country. Our results suggest that the prices of gold and stock can help form expectations of higher inflation over time. In the short run, only gold prices impact the interest rate in Japan. Overall the findings of this study could help the Japanese monetary authority in conducting monetary policy and investors of Japanese yen in building their optimal portfolios. Specifically our findings suggest that the optimal choice in the long term for those who invest in yen-denominated assets would be to include gold in their portfolios.
Xiaolin Xue
Executive Compensation with Endogenous Risk and Asymmetric Cost
This paper examines executive compensation in an environment where a CEO performs two tasks for a shareholder: use her private information about investment opportunities to select a project, and then exert costly effort to carry out the selected project. First, I identify the optimal contract in this setting and the analysis focuses on how the optimal contract must be modified to account for unobservable investment decisions. Second, I examine how the interaction of the two managerial tasks affects investment decisions. Conditions are provided under which a more or less risky project than the shareholder desires is selected. Third, I study how the unobservability of investment decisions decreases the shareholder’s expected profit and distorts managerial decisions further than unobservable effort. Last, I look into the consequences for the shareholder of ignoring unobservable investment decisions in designing an executive compensation scheme.
Feng Qu
A Lagrange Multiplier Test for Cross-sectional Dependence in a Fixed Effects Panel Data Model
Yanjian Zhu
Related Party Transactions and Institutional Investors in Chinese Listed Companies
We study the role that institutional investors play in Chinese listed companies with regards to related party transactions (RPTs). We use cross-sectional regression analysis to identify the factors that have a significant influence on firms’ use of RPTs. We also analyze stock prices and intraday trades in days around public announcements of RPTs. Our findings suggest that institutional investors in China do not influence corporate decisions on the use of RPTs but they react to RPT announcements through buying or selling shares.
